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Abstract
In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent
public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cy-
cle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks.
This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary
union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization poli-
cies and affects stabilization welfare.
We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a
benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy
games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios.
We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from
inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to non-
cooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves di-
rectly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large
country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation,
higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.
Keywords: Monetary union; optimal fiscal and monetary policies; asymmet-
ric countries; public debt. JEL codes: E52; E61; E62; E63
1 Introduction
In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the level of govern-
ment indebtedness has increased considerably in many European and Monetary
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Union (EMU) countries. Besides i) undermine the sustainability of public fi-
nances and ii) amplify steady-state distortions relative to the efficient outcome,
high public debt levels iii) directly hamper business cycle stabilization through
creating incentives to bias monetary policy towards debt-stabilization concerns.
Naturally, the latter risk is expected to be more effective under sufficiently large
debt-to-output ratios. However, debt consequences on stabilization costs are
not clearly unambiguous. Rising high public debt levels, by assigning a growing
role for a central bank towards debt stabilization, may enlarge the scope of fiscal
policy to stabilize the business cycle. In turn, the rise of the public debt levels,
when they are small enough and monetary policy is still assigned to its tradi-
tional price stabilization task, may cause higher stabilization costs as it may
force fiscal policy to accrued debt stabilization efforts. Moreover, the study of
the stabilization consequences of higher government indebtedness is particularly
relevant in a monetary union where national fiscal policymakers of different-size
countries interact strategically with a single monetary authority.
The stabilization impact of different government debt levels were examined
by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a), Stehn and Vines (2008a) and Blake and
Kirsanova (2010a) but in a closed economy context. This paper analyses how
the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary
fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects the welfare of each country-
member.
We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian macroeconomic model
with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, in line with that developed by
Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005). As in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b),
the model allows for fiscal policy to have demand and supply-side effects, by
considering as fiscal policy instruments the home-biased public consumption
and the tax rate, under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We
assume that the monetary authority - maximizing the union-wide welfare - and
the fiscal authorities - maximizing their national counterparts - engage in dis-
cretionary policy games. Optimal solutions are computed numerically using
appropriate algorithms to mimic cooperative outcomes and also to reflect the
different timing structures of the (non-cooperative) policy games: Nash, mone-
tary leadership and fiscal leadership. We follow the methodology developed in
the recent work of Kirsanova and co-authors (Blake and Kirsanova, 2010b, for a
closed-economy setup, and Kirsanova et al., 2005, for an open-economy setup).
Preliminary numerical results indicate that, monetary policy shifts from an
inflation-stabilization assignment to a debt-stabilization assignment, when debt
becomes high enough and that non-cooperation dominates cooperation in a low-
debt monetary union but the reverse occurs in a high-debt monetary union.
Furthermore, under policy cooperation, when large (small) steady-state debt-
to-output ratios increase symmetrically in both countries, welfare improves (de-
teriorates) for the whole union and for the large country while deteriorating
(improving) for the small country.
In turn, under non-cooperation (Nash, monetary leadership or fiscal leader-
ship) and for realistic debt levels, only the large country is able to benefit from
(symmetrically) higher levels of government indebtedness. The small country
and the union as a whole face higher welfare stabilization costs, the higher
debt-to-output levels are.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the setup for
policy analysis. In Section 3 we perform policy analysis related with dynamic
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responses and welfare evaluation under different debt levels. Section 4 concludes.
2 Setup for Policy Analysis
The model developed by Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) is extended to cap-
ture country-size asymmetry, to allow for a more generic case of cross-country
consumption elasticity and to include different fiscal policy scenarios.
The monetary union is modelled as a closed area with two countries, H
(Home) and F (Foreign), populated by a continuum of agents ∈ [0, 1] . The
relative dimension of country i (i = H,F ) is ni ∈ (0, 1), with nH + nF = 1.
While subject to idiosyncratic shocks, the countries are assumed to have iden-
tical economic structures and each one is characterized by two private sectors -
households and firms -, one fiscal authority, and is subject to a common mone-
tary policy.
To start, we address the optimization problem of households and firms, liv-
ing at country H (equivalent to that at F). The next step is to describe the
policy environment which includes the presentation of the policy instruments,
the equilibrium conditions and the policy objectives. The remainder of this
section characterizes the policy games and presents the benchmark calibration.
2.1 Households
The j-household seeks to maximize the following lifetime utility (Uj0 ).
U j0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
Cjt , C
H
t
)
+ V
(
GHt
)
− v
(
Ljt
)]
(1)
where
u
(
Cjt , C
H
t
)
= σ
σ−1
(
Cjt
)σ−1
σ
(
C
H
t
) 1
σ
V
(
GHt
)
= δ ψ
ψ−1
(
GHt
)ψ−1
ψ
v
(
Ljt
)
= d1+η
(
Ljt
)1+η
with Cjt , G
i
t and L
j
t denoting, respectively, private consumption, per capita
public consumption on domestically produced goods and hours of work. C
i
is
an exogenous disturbance which affects the demand for consumption goods and
Cj is a real consumption Dixit-Stiglitz index defined as
Cj ≡
[
n
1
ρ
H
(
CjH
)ρ−1
ρ
+ n
1
ρ
F
(
CjF
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(2)
where ρ the elasticity of substitution between H and F consumption baskets, CjH
and CjF are consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of differentiated goods
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produced, respectively, in country H and F
CjH,t ≡
[(
1
nH
) 1
θ
∫ nH
0
cjt (h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
; CjF,t ≡
[(
1
nF
) 1
θ
∫ 1
nH
cjt (f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
(3)
and θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in each coun-
try.
Maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the
form
PtC
j
t +Et
(
Qt,t+1D
j
t+1
)
=Wt (j)L
j
t +
∫ nH
0
Πjt (k) dk − PtT
H
t +D
j
t (4)
where P is the consumption-based price index defined below, W (j) is the nom-
inal wage rate of labour of type j, Πj (k) is the share of profits of domestic
firm k going to household j in country H and TH is a per capita lump sum tax.
Household j has access to a complete set of state-contingent securities that span
all possible states of nature and are traded across the union. Djt+1 denotes the
nominal payoff of a portfolio of state-contingent securities, purchased by the j-
household at date t, while Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period
ahead nominal payoffs, common across countries.
Assuming no trade barriers and given the structure of preferences, purchas-
ing power parity holds, and the underlying consumption-based price index (Pt)
is defined as
Pt ≡
[
n
H
P 1−ρH,t + nFP
1−ρ
F,t
] 1
1−ρ
, (5)
while the country-specific price indexes PH and PF are given by
PH,t ≡
[
1
n
H
∫ n
H
0
pt (h)
1−θ dh
] 1
1−θ
; PF,t ≡
[
1
n
F
∫ 1
n
H
pt (f)
1−θ df
] 1
1−θ
(6)
where p (h) and p (f) are the prices of typical goods h and f produced in H and
F, respectively.
The problem of the representative household can be split into an intertempo-
ral and an intratemporal problem. In regards to the household’s intratemporal
problem, it requires choosing the allocation of a given level of expenditure across
the differentiated goods to maximize the consumption index, Cj . Plugging into
the appropriate output aggregators the resulting individual demands and the
optimal government spending allocation across domestically produced goods,
we obtain the national aggregate demands, Y H and Y F ,
Y Ht =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
CWt +G
H
t (7H)
Y Ft =
(
PF,t
Pt
)−ρ
CWt +G
F
t (7F)
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where the union-wide consumption, CW , is defined as CW ≡
∫ 1
0
Cjdj, and
(
PH
P
)ρ−1
= n
H
+ n
F
T 1−ρ ;
(
PF
P
)ρ−1
= n
H
T ρ−1 + n
F
(8)
The variable T stands for the terms-of-trade, defined as the relative price of the
F-bundle of goods in terms of the H-bundle of goods (T ≡ PF /PH). According
to (8), changes in the terms-of-trade imply a larger response in a country’s
aggregate demand the smaller the size of the country, i.e., the larger the degree
of openness.
As for the household’s intertemporal problem, the household chooses the set
of processes
{
Cjt , L
j
t ;D
j
t+1
}∞
t=0
, taking as given all the other processes and the
initial wealth, as to maximize the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to
(4). Solution for this problem yields the familiar Euler equation
uc
(
Cjt , C
H
t
)
= β (1 + it)Et
{(
Pt
Pt+1
)
uc
(
Cjt+1, C
H
t+1
)}
, (9)
where 1 + it =
1
EtQt,t+1
is the gross risk-free nominal interest rate. Moreover,
assuming that the initial state-contingent distribution of nominal bonds is such
that the life-time budget constraints of all households are identical, the risk-
sharing condition implies that
uc
(
CHt , C
H
t
)
= uc
(
CFt , C
F
t
)
(10)
Finally, the labour supply decision determines that the real wage for labour type
j is given by
Wt (j)
Pt
= µHw,t ∗
vL
(
Ljt
)
uc
(
Cjt , C
H
t
) (11)
where µHw,t  1 is an exogenous H-specific wage markup that is used as a device
to introduce the possibility of "pure cost-push shocks" that affects the equilib-
rium price behaviour but does not change the efficient output, as in Benigno
and Woodford (2004, 2005).
2.2 Firms
There are a continuum of firms in country H and in country F . The production
function for the differentiated consumption good y, indexed by h ∈ [0, n
H
) in
country H and by f ∈ [n
H
, 1] in country F, is described, for y(h), by
yt (h) = a
H
t Lt (h) (12)
where aHt is an exogenous H-specific technology shock, common to all H-firms,
and Lt (h) is the firm-specific labour input offered by a continuum of H-households,
indexed in the unit interval. In a symmetric equilibrium, the work effort chosen
by the household
(
Lht
)
equals the aggregate labour input (Lt (h)).
Firms are assumed to set prices on a staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983).
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Each period, a randomly selected fraction of firms at H
(
1− αH
)
have the
opportunity to change their prices, independently of the time that has elapsed
since the last price-resetting, while the remaining firms keep the prices of the
previous period. If it has the chance to reset prices in period t, an optimizing
h-firm will set pot (h) in order to maximize the expected future profits, subject
to the demand for its product and the production technology. The first order
condition for this optimizing wage-taker firm can be expressed as
(
pot (h)
PH,t
)1+θη
=
θ
θ−1Et
∑∞
s=t
(
αHβ
)s−t
µHw,s
(
1− ζH
)
vy
(
Y Hs ; a
H
s
) (PH,s
PH,t
)θ(1+η)
Y Hs
Et
∑∞
s=t
(αHβ)
s−t
(1− τHs )uc
(
CHs , C
H
s
)(
PH,s
PH,t
)θ−1 (
PH,s
Ps
)
Y Hs
(13)
where pot (h) still applies at s, τ
H
s is a proportional tax rate on sales with the non-
zero steady-state level τH , and ζH is an employment subsidy fully financed by
lump sum taxes that, removing average monopolistic and tax rate distortions,
ensures the efficiency of the steady-state output level.1 The price index PH
evolves according to the law of motion
P 1−θH,t = α
HP 1−θH,t−1 +
(
1− αH
)
pot (h)
1−θ (14)
2.3 Policy Environment
In this section, we describe the instruments and constraints for the monetary
and fiscal policies and present a set of meaningful objective functions facing the
policy authorities. These policy functions have a twofold purpose: (i) to enable
the derivation of optimal discretionary policy rules across several regimes of
monetary and fiscal policies interactions and (ii) to assess the welfare impacts
of the different policy regimes.
2.3.1 Policy instruments and constraints
The monetary authority sets a common nominal interest rate, it, for the union.
As for fiscal policy, we assume that the home-biased government spending
(
GH
)
and the sales tax rate
(
τH
)
are the stabilization fiscal policy instruments and,
thus, fiscal policy encompasses demand and supply-side effects. In turn, lump-
sum taxes
(
TH
)
only adjust to fully accommodate an employment subsidy
(
ζH
)
and the government inter-temporal solvency condition appears as an additional
binding constraint to the set of possible equilibrium paths of the endogenous
variables. The budget constraints for the fiscal authorities can be written as
BHt = (1+it−1)B
H
t−1 + PH,tG
H
t − τ
H
t PH,tY
H
t (15H)
BFt = (1+it−1)B
F
t−1 + PF,tG
F
t − τ
F
t PF,tY
F
t (15F)
where BHt and B
F
t represent the per capita nominal government debt of country
H and F, respectively.2
1Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we use this employment subsidy as a
device to eliminate linear terms in the social welfare function without losing the possibility of
using the sales tax rates as fiscal policy instruments.
2With asset markets clearing only at the monetary union level, the sole public sector inter-
temporal budget constraint is the union-wide consolidated debt. However, in the context of
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Equivalently,
bit = (1 + it)
(
bit−1
Pt−1
Pt
+
Pi,t
Pt
Git − τ
i
t
Pi,t
Pt
Y it
)
, i = H,F (16)
where the variable bit ≡
(1+it)B
i
t
Pt
denotes the real value of debt at maturity in
per capita terms.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
To solve for the optimal policy, authorities have to take into account both the
private sector behaviour as well as the budget constraints, described above.
These conditions can be log-linearized and written in gap form as
Etc
w
t+1 = c
w
t + σ
(
it −Etπ
w
t+1
)
(17)
yHt = scρnF qt + (1− sc) g
H
t + scc
w
t (18H)
yFt = −scρnH qt + (1− sc) g
F
t + scc
w
t (18F)
πHt =k
H
[
(1 + scρη)nF qt +
1 + scση
σ
cwt + (1− sc) ηg
H
t +
τH(
1− τH
)τHt
]
+βEtπ
H
t+1
(19H)
πFt =k
F
[
− (1 + scρη)nHqt +
1 + scση
σ
cwt + (1− sc) ηg
F
t +
τF(
1− τF
)τFt
]
+βEtπ
F
t+1
(19F)
qt = qt−1 + π
F
t − π
H
t −
(
T˜t − T˜t−1
)
(20)
b̂Ht =
1
β
{
b̂Ht−1 − πt + nF (1− β) qt +
Y
b
H
[
(1− sc) g
H
t − τ
HyHt − τ
HτHt
]}
+it+ε̂bH ,t
(21H)
b̂Ft =
1
β
{
b̂Ft−1 − πt − nH (1− β) qt +
Y
b
F
[
(1− sc) g
F
t − τ
FyFt − τ
F τFt
]}
+it+ε̂bF ,t
(21F)
where
kH≡
(
1− αH
) (
1− αHβ
)
αH (1 + θη)
; kF≡
(
1− αF
) (
1− αFβ
)
αF (1 + θη)
,
ε̂bH ,t and ε̂bF ,t are composite shocks defined as
ε̂bH ,t = i˜t +
1
β
{
nF (1− β) T˜t +
Y
b
[
(1− sc) G˜
H
t − τ
H Y˜ Ht +
(
1− τH
)
µ̂Hw,t
]}
ε̂bF ,t = i˜t +
1
β
{
−nH (1− β) T˜t +
Y
b
[
(1− sc) G˜
F
t − τ
F Y˜ Ft +
(
1− τF
)
µ̂Fw,t
]}
a monetary union with an institutional arrangement like the EMU, there are arguments to
impose the verification of this inter-temporal budget constraint at the national levels.
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and where lower case variables refer to variables in gaps. For a generic variable,
Xt, its gap is defined as xt = X̂t−X˜t, where X̂t and X˜t denote, respectively, their
effective and efficient values, in log-deviations from the zero-inflation efficient
steady state (see, section 2.3.3, below).3 A "union-wide" variable, Xw, is defined
as Xw ≡ nXH + (1− n)XF .
Equation (17) refers to the IS equation, written in terms of the union con-
sumption4 and nominal interest-rate gaps. Equations (18H) and (18F) are
country-specific aggregate demand equations, with sc being the steady-state
consumption share of output and qt being the terms-of-trade gap (≡ T̂t − T˜t).
These three equations constitute the aggregate demand-side block of the model
and were derived from log-linearization of equations (7H), (7F), (8), (9) and
(10).
The aggregate supply-side block of the model was obtained from the log-
linear approximation of equations (13) and (14), as well as from their Foreign
counterparts, around the efficient steady state equilibrium. Equations (19H)
and (19F) are open-economy pure New-Keynesian aggregate supply (AS) curves.
Positive gaps on the terms-of-trade, consumption and public spending have in-
flationary consequences at H: an increase in the demand for H-produced goods
leads to more work effort, and, thus, raises marginal costs. Moreover, the pos-
itive gaps on the terms-of-trade and on the consumption exert an additional
inflationary pressure as they reduce the marginal utility of nominal income
for households. The efficient tax rate τ˜ it, used to compute the tax rate gap
(τ it = τ̂
i
t− τ˜
i
t) in country i, is defined as the tax rate required to fully offset the
impact of an idiosyncratic "cost-push" (wage markup) shock.5 Equation (20)
is the terms-of-trade gap’s identity, reflecting the inflation differential and the
one-period change in the efficient level of the terms-of-trade (T˜t − T˜t−1).
The final equations, (21H) and (21F), are the government budget constraints.
Shocks impinge on debt accumulation and create “fiscal stress” through their
effects on the efficient equilibrium.6
Given the path for policy instruments and the initial value of T̂t−1, the
system including equations (17)-(21F) provides solutions for the endogenous
variables cwt , y
H
t , y
F
t , π
H
t , π
F
t , qt, b
H
t and b
F
t .
2.3.3 Policy Objectives - The Social Planner’s Problem
The optimal allocation for the monetary union as a whole, in any given period
t, can be described as the solution to the following social planner’s problem,
where the single policy authority is willing to maximize the discounted sum of
the utility flows of the households belonging to the whole union (W ):
3This definition does not apply for the inflation rates, as stable prices are optimal under
sticky prices.
4The risk-sharing condition implies that cwt = c
H
t = c
F
t .
5The steady-state tax rates are given by τ i = (1− β) b
i
Y
+ (1− sc) and the efficient tax
rates by τ˜ it = −
1−τi
τi
µ̂iw,t, for i = H,F.
6The derivations of all these equations are available upon request.
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max
CH
H,t
, CF
H,t
, CH
F,t
,CF
F,t
,GHt ,G
F
t
W = E0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt[n
H
wHt + nFw
F
t ]
}
, (22)
with wHt = u
(
CHt , C
H
t
)
+ V
(
GHt
)
−
1
n
H
∫ n
H
0
v
(
Ljt
)
dj
and wFt = u
(
CFt , C
F
t
)
+ V
(
GFt
)
−
1
n
F
∫ 1
n
H
v
(
Ljt
)
dj
s.t.
(production functions) Y Ht = a
H
t L
H
t
Y Ft = a
F
t L
F
t
(resource constraints) n
H
Y Ht = nHC
H
H,t + nFC
F
H,t + nHG
H
t
n
F
Y Ft = nHC
H
F,t + nFC
F
F,t + nHG
F
t
(consumption indexes) CHt ≡
[
n
1
ρ
H
(
CHH,t
) ρ−1
ρ + n
1
ρ
F
(
CHF,t
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
CFt ≡
[
n
1
ρ
H
(
CFH,t
) ρ−1
ρ + n
1
ρ
F
(
CFF,t
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
The social planner will choose to produce equal quantities of the different
goods in each country. Moreover, the aggregation over all agents (households,
governments and central bank) cancels out the budget constraints and, thus,
the social planner’s solution is not constrained by them.
Maximization program in (22) yields the following optimallity conditions
uc
(
CHt , C
H
t
)
n
1
ρ
H
(
CHH,t
CHt
)− 1
ρ
= vy
(
Y Ht ; a
H
t
)
(23)
uc
(
CHt , C
H
t
)
n
1
ρ
F
(
CHF,t
CHt
)− 1
ρ
= vy
(
Y Ft ;a
F
t
)
(24)
uc
(
CFt , C
F
t
)
n
1
ρ
H
(
CFH,t
CFt
)− 1
ρ
= vy
(
Y Ht ; a
H
t
)
(25)
uc
(
CFt , C
F
t
)
n
1
ρ
F
(
CFF,t
CFt
)− 1
ρ
= vy
(
Y Ft ;a
F
t
)
(26)
VG
(
GHt
)
= vy
(
Y Ht , a
H
t
)
(27)
VG
(
GFt
)
= vy
(
Y Ft , a
F
t
)
(28)
Efficient equilibrium In a symmetric efficient steady state equilibrium, it
follows that Y
H
= Y
F
= Y ; CH = CF = C; CHH = C
F
H = nHC; C
H
F = C
F
F =
n
F
C and GH = GF = G.
The complete solution for the efficient equilibrium is given by the following
expressions (29-32)
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C˜wt =
1
1 + η [scσ + (1− sc)ψ]
{
[1 + (1− sc)ψη] Ĉ
w
t + (1 + η)σâ
w
t
}
(29)
C˜HH,t − C˜
H
F,t = C˜
F
H,t − C˜
F
F,t = −
ρ (1 + η)
1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ]
(
âFt − â
H
t
)
(30)
G˜wt =
ψ
1 + η [scσ + (1− sc)ψ]
[
−ηscĈ
w
t + (1 + η) â
w
t
]
(31)
G˜Ft − G˜
H
t =
(1 + η)ψ
1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ]
(
âFt − â
H
t
)
(32)
To fully define the gap variables described in section above, we need to deter-
mine the efficient interest rate and terms-of-trade levels. The former follows
directly from the Euler equation, while the latter results from the combination
of equation (30) with the optimal intratemporal household’s allocations
i˜t =
1
σ
Et
[(
C˜wt+1 − C˜
w
t
)
−
(
Ĉ
w
t+1 − Ĉ
w
t
)]
(33)
T˜t = −
1 + η
1 + η [scρ+ (1− sc)ψ]
(
âFt − â
H
t
)
. (34)
In a debt-unconstrained scenario this efficient allocation would correspond
to the decentralized flexible-price equilibrium when monopolistic and tax dis-
tortions are removed through an employment subsidy and the implemented
government spending rules agree with those derived under the social planner’s
optimization. However, in this debt-constrained policy scenario, that union-
wide optimal allocation may not be supported as a flexible-price equilibrium,
since fiscal policy instruments may have to deviate from those rules to ensure
fiscal solvency. Anyway, the policy problem will be formulated with variables
in gaps defined in terms of the efficient outcomes and the two steady state
equilibriums coincide.
Steady state equilibrium In order to avoid the traditional inflationary bias
problem arising from an inefficiently low steady-state output level, we will as-
sume the existence of an employment subsidy that removes average monopolis-
tic and tax rate distortions. To compute this employment subsidy, observe that
the profit-maximizing H-firms, in a flexible-price setup, choose the same price
pt (h) = PH,t such that
uc
(
CHt , C
H
t
)
=
θ
(θ − 1)
(
1− τHt
)µHw,t (1− ζH) [nH + nF T 1−ρt ] 11−ρ vy (Y Ht , aHt )
and, the F counterpart of this price-setting behaviour is given by
uc
(
CFt , C
F
t
)
=
θ
(θ − 1)
(
1− τFt
)µFw,t (1− ζF)[nHT ρ−1t + nF ] 11−ρ vy (Y Ft ;aFt )
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To get symmetry in the steady-state levels of the output, consumption,
government spending and prices in both countries, we need to impose that
θ
(θ−1)(1−τH)
µw
(
1− ζH
)
= θ
(θ−1)(1−τF )
µw
(
1− ζF
)
= µ where, as we have
already remarked, the employment subsidy ζi is fully financed by lump sum
taxes.
In steady state, we verify that
uc
(
C,C
)
= µvy
(
Y , a
)
and, if the employment subsidy ζi is set to match µ = 1, the efficient steady-
state output level holds. Hence, the employment subsidy in country i = H,F is
assumed to take the value
ζi = 1−
(θ − 1)
(
1− τ i
)
θµw
(35)
The steady-state nominal (and real) interest rate is i = 1−β
β
.
2.3.4 Policy Objectives - The Social Loss Function
Benevolent authorities, under full cooperation, seek to maximize welfare for the
monetary union as a whole, W , given, now, the set of equations describing the
effective economic structure dynamics (17)-(21F). This environment enables
the derivation of union-wide optimal stabilization policies, but serves also as a
benchmark to assess alternative policy regimes.
Following Woodford (2003), we compute the second-order approximation
of W around a deterministic steady state. Ignoring the terms independent of
policy and terms of three or higher order, the welfare objective takes the form:
W ≃ −ΩE0
{
∞∑
t=0
βtLt
}
, (36)
where the per-period social loss function (Lt), similar to the one derived by
Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), is defined as7
Lt = Λc (c
w
t )
2 +Λg
[
n
H
(
gHt
)2
+ n
F
(
gFt
)2]
+Λgcc
w
t
(
n
H
gHt + nF g
F
t
)
+ΛT q
2
t − ΛgT
(
gFt − g
H
t
)
qt + nHΛ
H
π
(
πHt
)2
+ n
F
ΛFπ
(
πFt
)2
(37)
and
Λc ≡ sc
(
1
σ
+ scη
)
, Λg ≡ (1− sc)
(
1
ψ
+ (1− sc)η
)
, Λgc ≡ 2sc (1− sc) η,
ΛT ≡ nHnF scρ (1 + scρη) , ΛgT ≡ 2nHnF sc (1− sc) ρη,
ΛHπ ≡
θ (1 + θη)αH
(1− αHβ) (1− αH)
, ΛFπ ≡
θ (1 + θη)αF
(1− αFβ) (1− αF )
Fluctuations in the consumption and the public spending gaps imply welfare
7The derivation of the social loss function is available upon request.
11
losses in line with the respective households’ risk aversions (1/σ and 1/ψ) and
with the elasticity of disutility with respect to work effort (η). Inflation at H
is more costly the higher the degree of nominal rigidity
(
αH
)
, the higher the
elasticity of substitution between H-produced goods (θ) and the higher η. The
welfare cost of inflation
(
ΛHπ
)
vanishes when prices are fully flexible
(
αH = 0
)
.
At the monetary union level, misallocation of goods also applies for devia-
tions of the terms-of-trade from the respective efficient level. The costs of this
distortion (ΛT ) increase with the elasticity of substitution between Home and
Foreign produced goods (ρ) , with the steady-state consumption share on output
(sc) , with η and decrease with country-size asymmetry. Following an asymmet-
ric technology shock, efficiency requires prices to change as to shift the adjust-
ment burden ”equally” across the two countries (Benigno and López-Salido,
2006). This creates a trade-off between the stabilization of relative prices to the
correspondent efficient levels and the stabilization of inflation in both countries
and it provides a rationale for the stabilization role of fiscal policy.
The cross-term between the consumption gap and the weighted average gov-
ernment spending gap occurs because positive co-movements between these two
variables cause undesirable fluctuations in the work effort for the monetary union
as a whole, in addition to the effort fluctuations caused by each of these vari-
ables per se. There is also a negative cross-term between the terms of trade gap
and the relative spending gap that is increasing (in absolute value) with η and
ρ, while decreasing with country-size asymmetry. This negative co-movement
arises because a positive terms-of-trade gap rises H-competitiveness which, com-
bined with a negative relative public spending gap (higher public spending at H
than at F), shifts demand towards H-produced goods. As a consequence, work
effort shifts from F- towards H-households (cf. Beetsma and Jensen 2004 and
2005, for these arguments).
2.3.5 Other policy objectives
We also consider that policymakers may have divergent policy objectives. This
is a valid assumption since it is reasonable to conjecture that national (fiscal)
authorities are mainly concerned with their own citizens and so, their objective
functions should only comprise the utility of the respective constituencies. Prag-
matically, we approximate the national welfare criteria through welfare losses
obtained from splitting the union-wide loss function.8
We will also consider the case of the delegation of monetary policy to a
weight-conservative central bank by distorting the weights on the inflation and
the output terms of the social loss function. This is usually seen as a potential
solution to reduce the time-inconsistency problems of policy stabilization, which
can be aggravated by specific incentives of the fiscal authorities.
8Forlati (2009) provides fully micro-founded welfare criteria for the case of non-coordinated
fiscal and monetary policies in a monetary union.
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The table below summarizes the policy environments we will analyze.
Benevolent Cooperative Policymakers
LH,Ft = L
M
t = Lt
Benevolent non-Cooperative Policymakers
LHt =Λc
(
cHt
)2
+Λg
(
gHt
)2
+Λgccwt g
H
t +ΛT q
2
t +
1
nH
ΛgT gHt qt+Λ
H
π
(
πHt
)2
LFt =Λc
(
cFt
)2
+Λg
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w
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F
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2
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1
nF
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F
t qt+Λ
F
π
(
πFt
)2
LMt = Lt
Conservative Central Bank
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F
t
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w
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+ρc
{
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(
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+n
F
ΛFπ
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)2}
2.4 Policy Games
We assume that fiscal and monetary authorities set their policy instruments in
order to minimize the respective loss functions, given the dynamic structure of
the economies, and that they can engage in various policy games. We will con-
sider, as a benchmark case for policy analysis, that policymakers are benevolent
and cooperate under discretion. To assess the importance of time-consistency,
we also compute the optimal policy solution under commitment. These two
optimizing problems will be solved by using the algorithms in Söderlind (1999).
We also consider discretionary non-cooperative policy games and, depending
on the time of events, we obtain Nash or leadership equilibria. In these differ-
ent setups, the timing of the events is as following: 1) the private sector forms
expectations; 2) the shocks are realized; 3a) the central bank sets the interest
rate; 3b) the fiscal authorities choose simultaneously the right amount of fiscal
policy instruments. There is a Nash equilibrium, if 3a) and 3b) occur simultane-
ously; there is monetary leadership if 3a) occurs before 3b); and, if the order of
these occurrences is reversed, there is a fiscal leadership. To solve for these dy-
namic policy games we use the methodology developed by Blake and Kirsanova
(2010b) and Kirsanova et al. (2005). The derivation of a numerical algorithm
for the solution of the non-cooperative monetary leadership discretionary game
is deferred to a separate appendix, available upon request.
2.5 Calibration
Our baseline calibration was chosen taking as reference Beetsma and Jensen
(2004, 2005), Benigno (2004), Benigno and López-Salido (2006) and Ferrero
(2009).
The discount factor β is 0.99, which implies a 4% annual basis steady-state
interest rate. The parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced in the same country, is equal to 11, implying a price mark-up of 10%.
In turn, the elasticity of substitution between H and the F produced goods, ρ,
is set at 4.5. We assume σ = ψ = 0.4, which implies a coefficient of risk aversion
for private and public consumption equal to 2.5. The steady-state share of
public consumption in output (1− sc) is set at 0.25.We parameterize η = 0.47,
13
implying a labour supply elasticity of 1/0.47.
Our benchmark calibration aims to reflect a perfectly symmetric setup from
which we can diverge and assess how country-size asymmetry affects the re-
sults. Hence, we begin by assuming that the two economies in the monetary
union are of equal size (ni = 0.5) and have identical degrees of nominal rigidities(
αH = αF
)
. We select a value for α equal to 0.75, in order to get an average
length of price contracts equal to one year.
The country-size asymmetry case is illustrated for n
H
= 0.8.
We set yearly steady-state debt-to-output ratio (b/4Y ) within the range
[5%; 19%] , step 2.5 pp., to characterize a low-debt monetary union. For the
high-debt monetary union, the debt ratios are set on the interval [40%; 110%] ,
step 10 pp.. The above mentioned ranges were set as to allow for a single
equilibrium for all debt-to-output levels and to ensure that welfare dynamics
evolves monotonically with debt. In particular, the low-debt monetary union is
illustrated for a debt-to-output ratio of 10%, while the high-debt case takes as
reference a debt level of 60%.
Finally, we assume that the consumption and the technology shocks follow
an uncorrelated AR(1) process with common persistence of 0.85, while the wage
mark-up shocks are i.i.d., and the standard deviation of the innovations are equal
to 0.01.
3 Optimal discretionary stabilization policies
The increasing levels of government indebtedness experienced by the general-
ity of the EMU countries are expected to hamper considerably business cycle
stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. Actually,
these negative consequences for macroeconomic stabilization are expected to be
more serious under discretion than under commitment. This follows from the
fact that debt-constrained optimal stabilization policies face a policy trade-off
between short-run stabilization and the reduction of permanent effects on debt
and real welfare-related variables. Given welfare’s convexity and discounting,
the optimal policy solution under commitment delivers permanent effects on
debt (and on real welfare-related variables) and, thus, the pre-shock public debt
level affects only marginally the policy response to shocks and welfare.9 Con-
versely, time-consistency (discretion) requires that permanent effects are fully
eliminated and all variables return to their pre-shock levels and, thus, the ini-
tial level of government indebtedness meaningfully affects the policy response
to shocks and welfare.
However, as we will see next, such welfare consequences are far from being
clearly unambiguous. As Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) or Stehn and Vines
(2008a) remarked, the elimination of permanent effects is achieved diversely
when public debts are small or large, because the level of government indebt-
edness affects the relative effectiveness of the fiscal and monetary policy instru-
ments attached to debt-stabilization. The effectiveness of monetary policy on
9This result is reminiscent of the tax smoothing result of the optimal taxation literature
(Barro, 1979 and Lucas and Stokey, 1983).
Benigno and Woodford (2004), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) or Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2007a), on closed economy models, and Ferrero (2009) or Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b), on
open economy models, show that the optimal policy response to shocks requires permanent
variations in the level of public debt.
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promoting debt-stabilization increases with the initial level of public debt, be-
cause its leverage over debt-interest payments increases, while that of the fiscal
policy diminishes. Furthermore, fiscal policy instruments — particularly, the tax
rate — become progressively more apt to offset inflationary consequences, the
larger the steady-state debt-to-output ratios are (as higher debt steady-state
levels lead to higher steady-state tax rate levels and, so, a negative tax rate
gap has a larger negative impact on inflation). Hence, the level of government
indebtedness crucially shapes the optimal monetary and fiscal policy responses
to shocks under discretion.
For sufficiently small debt levels (b < 20%, under our calibration), in face of
a symmetric shock simultaneously boosting debt and inflation, the conventional
monetary and fiscal policy assignments apply: in the first period, the interest
rate gap increases to control for inflation (“active” monetary policy) and gov-
ernment spending gaps diminish while the tax rate gaps increase to provide debt
stabilization (“passive” fiscal policy).10
However, if the level of government indebtedness becomes too high, un-
conventional policy assignments may emerge: monetary policy moves towards
debt stabilization (“passive” monetary policy) and aggregate fiscal policy may
move towards the inflation stabilization assignment (“active” fiscal policy) for
b > 60% (Cf. Figure 1, responses to a symmetric negative technology shock for
b = 10% and b = 80%, under policy cooperation). Thus, the stabilization con-
sequences of higher government indebtedness are critically determined by the
level of public debt itself, given its key influence on monetary and fiscal policy
interactions.
10Taking as a starting point Leeper’s (1991) categorization of “passive”/“active” policies,
we refer to a “passive” policy when it promotes debt-stabilization. Otherwise, when policy
instruments promote short-run stabilization, policy is said to be “active”.
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Figure 1: Responses to a symmetric negative 1% technology shock, Cooperation
Therefore, to assess the stabilization constraints from different public debt
levels we will consider two policy scenarios: a low-debt and a high-debt monetary
union. The former requires for an “active” monetary policy while the latter
requires for a “passive” monetary policy.
3.1 Low-debt Monetary Union
In our analysis the economies are hit by the full menu of shocks; however, we
focus on technology shocks because their impacts on welfare dominate.11
3.1.1 Cooperation
Country-specific technology shocks cause asymmetric budgetary consequences:
higher in the home than in the foreign country. As a consequence, domestic
effects dominate union-wide effects and monetary policy’s response. Further-
more, time-consistency and the consequent debt stabilization bias make do-
mestic shocks to cause higher stabilization costs than external ones.12 Figure 2
details the impulse responses of key endogenous variables to a 1% negative tech-
nology shock hitting country H, in a country-size symmetric monetary union,
11Technology shocks account for more than 88% of the total of the stabilization costs of the
union. Considering the available policy stabilization instruments, consumption and cost-push
shocks produce stabilization trade-offs only because of their effects on debt: trade-offs would
be fully eliminated, if lump-sum taxes were available to ensure balanced-budget.
12 In a debt-unconstrained policy scenario, domestic and foreign technology shocks have
symmetric impacts and that requires symmetric fiscal policy responses; equally-distributed
stabilization costs apply (see Machado and Ribeiro, 2010).
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considering two alternative debt-to-output ratios. It confirms that the union-
wide inflation follows the same path of domestic (H) inflation and that the latter
fluctuates more than foreign (F) inflation.
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Figure 2: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H, Cooperation
Also, the higher steady-state debt-to-output ratios are, the larger are bud-
getary consequences of the shock as well as the incentives towards debt-stabilization;
thus, as we have already referred the stabilization costs are expected to be larger.
In fact, larger steady-state debt-to-output ratios amplify the budgetary con-
sequences of a domestic country-specific technology shock while they attenuate
those of an external shock, even when monetary policy becomes progressively
less biased towards the control of the union-wide (and H) inflation (a less “ac-
tive” MP occurs only for b  10%), given the higher basis of incidence of debt-
service costs. Fiscal policy also becomes more biased towards debt-stabilization
(more “passive” FP) in face of a domestic shock while the reverse occurs in face
of an external one. Therefore, the stabilization performance of domestic shocks
deteriorates while that of external shocks improves, for higher levels of gov-
ernment indebtedness (Cf., in Figure 2, the different stabilization performances
regarding inflation at H and F for different debt levels). Under equal-size coun-
tries, the first effect dominates and, as expected, welfare deteriorates for higher
debt-to-output ratios (Table 5, for nH = 0.5).
Under country-size asymmetry, changes in the relative prices affect more the
marginal costs and inflation rates of smaller (and more open) economies; thus,
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country-specific shocks inflict higher stabilization costs to a small country than
to a large one. In turn, country-specific shocks at the large country naturally
dominate welfare evaluation for the large (domestic shocks) as well as for the
small (external shocks) country. Hence, welfare improves for the small country
and reduces for the large country as well as for the union, when the indebtedness
level increases across all the monetary union governments (Table 5, for nH =
0.8).
3.1.2 Non-Cooperation
Given the assumptions we made on the policy objective functions under non-
cooperation, differences in policy outcomes relative to cooperation only arise
because national fiscal authorities do not internalize the cross-border effects of
their policies. Relative to cooperation, nationally-oriented fiscal policies react
less (more) when they cause positive (negative) externalities.
Compared with cooperation, in a country-size symmetric monetary union, a
negative technology shock at H requires a smaller variation of the tax rate gap
and a larger response of the government spending gap in both countries, because
these instruments have opposite cross-border effects.13 Furthermore, since the
domestic (foreign) fiscal policy reaction causes a positive (negative) external-
ity on the union-wide debt, non-cooperation leads to a relatively less (more)
“passive” policy at H (F). Under Nash and relative to cooperation, aggregate
fiscal policy ends up by being less “passive” and monetary policy becomes less
“active”.14 The benefit on better macroeconomic stabilization from fiscal policy
moderation dominates the cost of reducing monetary policy activeness, resulting
in a superior welfare relative to cooperation. This finding confirms a more gen-
eral result that policy cooperation can be counterproductive in the presence of a
pre-existing distortion.15 The already existing bias towards insufficient (fiscal)
stabilization (debt-stabilization bias) worsens when the fiscal authorities shift
from non-cooperation towards cooperation.
Relative to Nash, monetary leadership alleviates even more time-consistency
problems while fiscal leadership magnifies them. Under fiscal leadership, being
aware of monetary policy’s “activeness”, aggregate fiscal policy becomes more
“passive”, with negative consequences for macroeconomic stabilization. Under
monetary leadership, being aware of fiscal authorities’ incentives towards less
debt-adjustment, monetary policy’s response becomes more aggressive towards
inflation-adjustment and allows for a better stabilization outcome, relative to
Nash. Monetary leadership dominates fiscal leadership, except for very low debt
levels (b < 6.5%), and all non-cooperative outcomes grant lower stabilization
costs than cooperation (see Table 5, for nH = 0.5).
As in cooperation, when steady-state debt-to-output ratios increase, the
13The tax rate responses alleviate the effects of the shock on the terms-of-trade gap (positive
externality) while those of the government spending magnify them (negative externality).
14This can be checked by computing, for cooperation and Nash, the aggregate government
spending and tax rate responses to an idiosyncratic negative technology shock at H, using the
feedback coefficients on Table 1.
15The argument follows from the key contribution of Rogoff (1985), according to which
the cooperation among a subset of players (all policymakers) could lead to such an adverse
reaction of the outsiders (the private sectors of the two countries) that all players would be
better off by not cooperating. Non-cooperation may alleviate time-consistency problems. See
Beetsma et al. (2001) for a review on the literature on the desirability of policy coordination.
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stabilization costs of domestic shocks increase and dominate the reduction of
those attached to external shocks, consequently welfare deteriorates with debt.
In a country-size asymmetric monetary union, it matters the type but also
the size of the externality non-internalized by the fiscal authorities of both coun-
tries. The small countries, causing small externalities, have incentives to engage
in more debt-adjusting fiscal policies than under cooperation while large coun-
tries face the reverse incentives. Under Nash, the (union-wide benevolent) cen-
tral bank corrects the effects of such asymmetry reacting relatively more to the
inflationary consequences suffered by a small country than it would do under
cooperation, while taking the converse attitude relative to the large country
(cf. the monetary feedback coefficients on technology shocks at Table 2, co-
operation vs. Nash). Compared with cooperation, the resulting policy-mix is
welfare-improving for the small country and for the union as a whole while
welfare-decreasing for the large country (see Table 5, for nH = 0.8).
Fiscal leadership intensifies the fiscal policy response of the large country
to debt consequences, once monetary policy is expected to control for domes-
tic inflationary consequences. In turn, under monetary leadership, the central
bank, anticipating the incentives, further enhances fiscal discipline for the large
country while moderates that of the small country.
The welfare losses reported in Table 5 show that non-cooperation dominates
cooperation, for the small country and the monetary union as a whole while
the reverse occurs for the large country. However, a small country is always
better-off under monetary leadership while a large country clearly prefers fiscal
leadership to monetary leadership. At the union level, monetary leadership
allows for a better stabilization performance than fiscal leadership for sufficiently
high debt levels (b  10%).
Furthermore, larger debt levels worsen the stabilization performance at the
union level. However, a large country can benefit with larger debt levels if they
are high enough (b > 10%), under its most preferred regime (fiscal leadership);
and a small country can take advantage from higher government indebtedness,
but only for sufficiently low debt levels (b < 12.5%) and under monetary lead-
ership (see Table 5).
3.2 High-debt Monetary Union
3.2.1 Cooperation
As before, domestic shocks cause higher stabilization costs than external shocks.
However, as monetary policy is now “passive” and assists, with increasing ef-
fectiveness, the control of the union-wide and domestic debts, domestic fiscal
policy becomes progressively less biased towards debt-management (less “pas-
sive) and the stabilization performance of domestic shocks improves, with the
level of government indebtedness. On the contrary, the foreign country experi-
ences a worse stabilization performance, because monetary policy, enlarging its
budgetary consequences, forces fiscal policy to deviate towards debt stabiliza-
tion. Thus, differently from the low-debt scenario, the stabilization performance
of domestic shocks improves while that of external shocks deteriorates, for larger
debt-to-output ratios, as it is apparent from Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H, Cooperation
At odd with expected, under equal-size countries, the first effect dominates
and welfare improves, except when debt becomes too high (b > 140%, cf. Table
6). This result also applies for the whole monetary union under country-size
asymmetry as well as for the large country. However, for the small and more
open economy, the worse stabilization of external (H) shocks dominates over the
improvement in the stabilization of domestic (F) shocks and welfare deteriorates,
for larger debt-to-output ratios across the union (Table 6).
3.2.2 Non-Cooperation
In a country-size symmetric monetary union, the incentives for the fiscal author-
ities under non-cooperation are common to those observed in a low-debt mon-
etary union. However, in a high-debt scenario the response of monetary policy
is completely different. Under Nash, while aggregate fiscal policy remains, as in
the low-debt scenario, less biased towards debt-adjustment, the central bank is
compelled to a more “passive” monetary policy in order to soften aggregate debt
adjustment.16 The inflationary stance of monetary policy aggravates and dom-
inates over the benefit from enhanced macroeconomic stabilization delivered by
fiscal policy moderation. Therefore, Nash is welfare-inferior to cooperation. Rel-
ative to Nash, fiscal leadership magnifies the monetary policy time-consistency
16This can be checked by computing, for cooperation and Nash, the aggregate government
spending and tax rate responses to an idiosyncratic negative technology shock at H, using the
feedback coefficients reported in Table 3.
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problems while fiscal leadership alleviates them. Under fiscal leadership, being
aware of the monetary policy reaction against debt misalignments, fiscal au-
thorities care even less about debt control. On balance, Nash solution effects
are reinforced and, thus, fiscal leadership delivers an even worse stabilization
outcome. In turn, a leading central bank, being aware of fiscal authorities’ in-
centives towards less debt-adjustment, moderates its “passive” monetary policy
and compels national governments to act closer to the cooperative outcome,
yielding lower welfare costs. (See Table 6, nH = 0.5)
Now, the increase of government indebtedness augments the stabilization
costs of domestic and external shocks and, thus, the union’s welfare gets worse,
in contrast with the cooperative outcome.
In a country-size asymmetric monetary union, the differentiated incentives of
small and large countries determine, now, that the central bank accommodates
the budgetary consequences of the small country relatively more than it would do
under cooperation, while taking the converse attitude relative to the large coun-
try (cf. the monetary feedback coefficients on technology shocks in Table 4, co-
operation vs. Nash). The resulting policy-mix under Nash is welfare-decreasing
for the small country and the union as a whole while welfare-improving for the
large country (see Table 6). Fiscal leadership further moderates the fiscal pol-
icy response of the large country to debt consequences, once monetary policy is
expected to adjust further to its domestic debt. In turn, monetary leadership
enhances fiscal discipline for the large country, as the central bank, anticipating
the incentives, accommodates to a lower extent its budgetary consequences.
The welfare losses reported in Table 6 show that, cooperation dominates
non-cooperation, for the small country and the monetary union as a whole
while the reverse occurs for the large country. As in the low-debt case, a small
country is always better-off under monetary leadership while a large country
clearly prefers fiscal leadership. At the union level, monetary leadership allows
for a better stabilization performance than fiscal leadership.
Furthermore, in contrast with the cooperative outcome, larger debt levels
worsen the stabilization performance at the union level. However, this welfare
reduction impacts exclusively in the small country, as the large country achieves
an increasing stabilization performance, when debt increases.
4 Concluding Remarks
Average union debt levels appear to be non-neutral to union-wide and country-
specific stabilization performance.
A first set of implications are related to debt levels impacts on monetary
policy assignment. The union-wide benevolent central bank makes interest rate
optimally react to promote inflation stabilization for sufficiently low debt-to-
output levels, but the reaction function shifts towards debt-stabilization when
union average debt becomes large enough. This monetary policy shift impinges
strong inflexions regarding welfare stabilization.
First, while in a high-debt scenario cooperation dominates non-cooperation
at the union level, in a low-debt scenario non-cooperative outcomes are welfare
superior. Non-cooperation induces fiscal policy to be less debt-adjusting at
the union-wide level, as fiscal authorities do not fully internalize the positive
externality on the union-wide debt.
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In a high-debt environment, the mitigation of fiscal policy time-consistency
problems aggravates those of monetary policy in such a way that non-cooperation
delivers worse stabilization outcomes than cooperation. Conversely, in a low-
debt environment, monetary policy only becomes less “active”, allowing for
non-cooperation to deliver better stabilization outcomes than cooperation.
Second, unequal-size countries, causing asymmetric externalities, have dis-
tinct incentives under non-cooperation that induce monetary policy to be rela-
tively more “active”/”passive” towards the small country under low/high-debt
scenarios. As a consequence, the small country achieves a better/worse sta-
bilization performance under non-cooperation under low/high-debt scenarios,
while the reverse occurs for the large country.
Finally, the leadership structure has key stabilization consequences. Clearly,
a large country benefits with fiscal leadership while a small country is better-off
under monetary leadership. At the union level, monetary leadership dominates
fiscal leadership for reasonable debt levels.
A second set of implications is how the previous mentioned outcomes move
along different debt levels.
As regards cooperation, the increase of government debt produces opposite
welfare results in low and high-debt scenarios. It enlarges (reduces) welfare
stabilization costs for the union as whole and for a large country while the
reverse occurs for a small country, in a low (high) debt monetary union.
As for non-cooperation, the increase in government indebtedness reduces the
union’s welfare in the two debt scenarios. Debt mostly worsens the stabilization
performance of the small country while it mostly improves that of the large
country.
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Tables
Table 1: Policy reaction functions, Debt = 10%, nH = 0.5
aHt
(1)
aFt
(2)
µHt
(3)
µFt
(4)
cwt
(5)
aHt−1
(6)
aFt−1
(7)
qt−1
(8)
bHt−1
(9)
bFt−1
(10)
it -0.0410 -0.0410 0.0642 0.0642 -0.1871 0.0000 -0.0000 0 0.0344 0.0344
gHt 0.2789 -0.2412 -0.0590 -0.0001 0.0862 -0.2178 0.2178 -0.3902 -0.0316 -0.0001
C τHt -3.0823 1.6134 2.2703 0.0307 -3.3549 1.1632 -1.1632 2.0836 1.2173 0.0165
gFt -0.2412 0.2789 -0.0001 -0.0590 0.0862 0.2178 -0.2178 0.3902 -0.0001 -0.0316
τFt 1.6134 -3.0823 0.0307 2.2703 -3.3549 -1.1632 1.1632 -2.0836 0.0165 1.2173
it -0.0405 -0.0405 0.0635 0.0635 -0.1851 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0340 0.0340
gHt 0.2967 -0.2635 -0.0515 -0.0005 0.0758 -0.3599 0.3599 -0.6448 -0.0276 -0.0002
N τHt -2.3261 0.8668 1.9221 0.3638 -3.3330 3.8982 -3.8982 6.9830 1.0306 0.1951
gFt -0.2635 0.2967 -0.0005 -0.0515 0.0758 0.3599 -0.3599 0.6448 -0.0002 -0.0276
τFt 0.8668 -2.3261 0.3638 1.9221 -3.3330 -3.8982 3.8982 -6.9830 0.1951 1.0306
it -0.0422 -0.0422 0.0661 0.0661 -0.1927 0 0 0 0.0354 0.0354
gHt 0.2840 -0.2509 -0.0486 -0.0032 0.0755 -0.3446 0.3446 -0.6173 -0.0261 -0.0017
FL τHt -3.0649 1.5718 2.1074 0.2316 -3.4103 5.3897 -5.3897 9.6547 1.1300 0.1242
gFt -0.2509 0.2840 -0.0032 -0.0486 0.0755 0.3446 -0.3446 0.6173 -0.0017 -0.0261
τFt 1.5718 -3.0649 0.2316 2.1074 -3.4103 -5.3897 5.3897 -9.6547 0.1242 1.1300
it -0.0408 -0.0408 0.0639 0.0639 -0.1862 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0342 0.0342
gHt 0.2966 -0.2635 -0.0514 -0.0004 0.0755 -0.3595 0.3595 -0.6439 -0.0276 -0.0002
ML τHt -2.3160 0.8569 1.9203 0.3654 -3.3326 3.8662 -3.8662 6.9255 1.0297 0.1959
gFt -0.2635 0.2966 -0.0004 -0.0514 0.0755 0.3595 -0.3595 0.6439 -0.0002 -0.0276
τFt 0.8569 -2.3160 0.3654 1.9203 -3.3326 -3.8662 3.8662 -6.9255 0.1959 1.0297
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Table 2: Policy reaction functions, Debt = 10%, nH = 0.8
aHt
(1)
aFt
(2)
µHt
(3)
µFt
(4)
cwt
(5)
aHt−1
(6)
aFt−1
(7)
qt−1
(8)
bHt−1
(9)
bFt−1
(10)
it -0.0655 -0.0164 0.1027 0.0257 -0.1871 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0551 0.0138
gHt 0.1342 -0.0965 -0.0590 -0.0000 0.0862 -0.0871 0.0871 -0.1561 -0.0317 -0.0000
C τHt -2.1142 0.6454 2.2887 0.0123 -3.3549 0.4653 -0.4653 0.8334 1.2272 0.0066
gFt -0.3859 0.4236 -0.0002 -0.0589 0.0862 0.3486 -0.3486 0.6244 -0.0001 -0.0316
τFt 2.5815 -4.0504 0.0491 2.2519 -3.3549 -1.8611 1.8611 -3.3338 0.0263 1.2075
it -0.0385 -0.0391 0.0977 0.0239 -0.1773 -0.0673 0.0673 -0.1205 0.0524 0.0128
gHt 0.1377 -0.1020 -0.0552 -0.0008 0.0815 -0.1607 0.1607 -0.2879 -0.0296 -0.0004
N τHt -1.4740 0.0355 2.1014 0.1521 -3.2857 1.0770 -1.0770 1.9293 1.1268 0.0815
gFt -0.4157 0.4445 -0.0037 -0.0414 0.0658 0.6388 -0.6388 1.1442 -0.0020 -0.0222
τFt 1.6273 -2.9945 0.6312 1.5105 -3.1228 -9.9399 9.9399 -17.8057 0.3385 0.8099
it -0.0647 -0.0149 0.1054 0.0194 -0.1820 -0.0201 0.0201 -0.0360 0.0565 0.0104
gHt 0.1293 -0.0937 -0.0533 -0.0024 0.0813 -0.1406 0.1406 -0.2519 -0.0286 -0.0013
FL τHt -1.9396 0.4848 2.2137 0.0653 -3.3228 2.0106 -2.0106 3.6016 1.1870 0.0350
gFt -0.4107 0.4396 -0.0047 -0.0405 0.0659 0.6359 -0.6359 1.1392 -0.0025 -0.0217
τFt 2.1558 -3.5595 0.5664 1.6326 -3.2062 -11.4902 11.4902 -20.5827 0.3037 0.8754
it -0.1021 0.0208 0.1117 0.0156 -0.1855 -0.1620 0.1620 -0.2902 0.0599 0.0083
gHt 0.1555 -0.1187 -0.0600 0.0023 0.0841 -0.0928 0.0928 -0.1663 -0.0322 0.0012
ML τHt -2.3656 0.8521 2.3190 0.0519 -3.4569 -0.9814 0.9814 -1.7580 1.2435 0.0278
gFt -0.3929 0.4183 -0.0044 -0.0354 0.0581 0.6543 -0.6543 1.1720 -0.0024 -0.0190
τFt 0.3327 -1.5473 0.6755 1.2274 -2.7744 -9.9329 9.9329 -17.7930 0.3622 0.6581
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Table 3: Policy reaction functions, Debt = 60%, nH = 0.5
aHt
(1)
aFt
(2)
µHt
(3)
µFt
(4)
cwt
(5)
aHt−1
(6)
aFt−1
(7)
qt−1
(8)
bHt−1
(9)
bFt−1
(10)
it 0.6826 0.6826 -0.1734 -0.1734 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5733 -0.5733
gHt 0.3391 -0.1862 -0.0497 0.0109 0.0327 -0.2053 0.2053 -0.3678 -0.1644 0.0359
C τHt -2.4114 2.0082 1.0910 -0.9886 -0.0863 0.6206 -0.6206 1.1117 3.6068 -3.2681
gFt -0.1862 0.3391 0.0109 -0.0497 0.0327 0.2053 -0.2053 0.3678 0.0359 -0.1644
τFt 2.0082 -2.4114 -0.9886 1.0910 -0.0863 -0.6206 0.6206 -1.1117 -3.2681 3.6068
it 0.7520 0.7520 -0.1911 -0.1911 0.3218 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.6316 -0.6316
gHt 0.3594 -0.2256 -0.0471 0.0131 0.0286 -0.2269 0.2269 -0.4065 -0.1557 0.0433
N τHt -0.0943 1.1465 0.5464 -0.8137 0.2251 -1.8627 1.8627 -3.3366 1.8061 -2.6899
gFt -0.2256 0.3594 0.0131 -0.0471 0.0286 0.2269 -0.2269 0.4065 0.0433 -0.1557
τFt 1.1465 -0.0943 -0.8137 0.5464 0.2251 1.8627 -1.8627 3.3366 -2.6899 1.8061
it 0.7524 0.7524 -0.1912 -0.1912 0.3220 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6320 -0.6320
gHt 0.3396 -0.2056 -0.0437 0.0097 0.0287 -0.1830 0.1830 -0.3278 -0.1445 0.0320
FL τHt 0.3780 0.6837 0.4446 -0.7143 0.2272 -2.6778 2.6778 -4.7968 1.4696 -2.3613
gFt -0.2056 0.3396 0.0097 -0.0437 0.0287 0.1830 -0.1830 0.3278 0.0320 -0.1445
τFt 0.6837 0.3780 -0.7143 0.4446 0.2272 2.6778 -2.6778 4.7968 -2.3613 1.4696
it 0.6932 0.6932 -0.1761 -0.1761 0.2966 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5823 -0.5823
gHt 0.3627 -0.2208 -0.0479 0.0119 0.0304 -0.2350 0.2350 -0.4210 -0.1584 0.0392
ML τHt -0.3669 1.0894 0.6066 -0.7901 0.1546 -1.5500 1.5500 -2.7766 2.0052 -2.6120
gFt -0.2208 0.3627 0.0119 -0.0479 0.0304 0.2350 -0.2350 0.4210 0.0392 -0.1584
τFt 1.0894 -0.3669 -0.7901 0.6066 0.1546 1.5500 -1.5500 2.7766 -2.6120 2.0052
26
Table 4: Policy reaction functions, Debt = 60%, nH = 0.8
aHt
(1)
aFt
(2)
µHt
(3)
µFt
(4)
cwt
(5)
aHt−1
(6)
aFt−1
(7)
qt−1
(8)
bHt−1
(9)
bFt−1
(10)
it 1.0921 0.2730 -0.2775 -0.0694 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.9173 -0.2293
gHt 0.2274 -0.0745 -0.0432 0.0043 0.0327 -0.0821 0.0821 -0.1471 -0.1428 0.0144
Coop τHt -1.2065 0.8033 0.4979 -0.3954 -0.0863 0.2482 -0.2482 0.4447 1.6459 -1.3072
gFt -0.2978 0.4508 0.0174 -0.0562 0.0327 0.3285 -0.3285 0.5885 0.0574 -0.1859
τFt 3.2131 -3.6163 -1.5817 1.6842 -0.0863 -0.9929 0.9929 -1.7786 -5.2289 5.5676
it 0.9293 0.5793 -0.2338 -0.1495 0.3228 -3.1787 3.1787 -5.6940 -0.7730 -0.4942
gHt 0.1456 -0.0272 -0.0242 -0.0059 0.0253 -0.3065 0.3065 -0.5490 -0.0800 -0.0194
Nash τHt 1.4286 -0.5334 -0.0721 -0.1553 0.1915 -3.5439 3.5439 -6.3482 -0.2384 -0.5135
gFt -0.4296 0.5744 0.0210 -0.0578 0.0310 0.4076 -0.4076 0.7302 0.0694 -0.1910
τFt 6.8594 -5.5344 -1.6558 1.3191 0.2835 -16.9330 16.9330 -30.3325 -5.4738 4.3608
it 0.9368 0.5749 -0.2294 -0.1547 0.3234 -2.9852 2.9852 -5.3476 -0.7584 -0.5113
gHt 0.1364 -0.0178 -0.0226 -0.0075 0.0254 -0.2692 0.2692 -0.4823 -0.0747 -0.0249
FL τHt 1.7470 -0.8120 -0.1151 -0.1225 0.2001 -4.0777 4.0777 -7.3045 -0.3805 -0.4048
gFt -0.4037 0.5484 0.0172 -0.0539 0.0310 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5466 0.0568 -0.1783
τFt 6.1141 -4.7821 -1.5078 1.1694 0.2850 -13.0557 13.0557 -23.3871 -4.9846 3.8657
it 0.6527 0.7404 -0.1957 -0.1582 0.2981 -3.0052 3.0052 -5.3833 -0.6471 -0.5231
gHt 0.1457 -0.0265 -0.0239 -0.0064 0.0255 -0.3578 0.3578 -0.6408 -0.0789 -0.0212
ML τHt 1.2850 -0.4787 -0.0305 -0.1744 0.1725 -3.7175 3.7175 -6.6592 -0.1008 -0.5765
gFt -0.4309 0.5880 0.0230 -0.0629 0.0336 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5465 0.0761 -0.2080
τFt 6.3608 -5.4950 -1.6520 1.4320 0.1853 -14.6393 14.6393 -26.2237 -5.4611 4.7339
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Table 5: Losses − H and F households (LH , LF ) and union-wide (L) − Low-Debt
b = 5% b = 7.5% b = 10% b = 12.5% b = 15% b = 19%
nH= 0.5 - Union-wide loss*100
LCoop 4.7806 4.8124 4.8459 4.8786 4.9082 4.9444
LN 4.6836 4.6825 4.7052 4.7512 4.8134 4.9132
LML 4.6781 4.6821 4.7047 4.7439 4.7941 4.8767
LFL 4.6604 4.6952 4.7382 4.7879 4.8393 4.9036
nH= 0.8 - Union-wide loss*100
LCoop 3.1790 3.2154 3.2550 3.2954 3.3339 3.3857
LN 3.1214 3.1323 3.1578 3.2015 3.2617 3.3681
LML 3.1298 3.1486 3.1760 3.2116 3.2523 3.3146
LFL 3.1153 3.1429 3.1775 3.2222 3.2771 3.3624
nH= 0.8 - Loss of a representative household country H and F
L
H
Coop 2.4060 2.4694 2.5388 2.6099 2.6778 2.7692
L
H
N 2.6775 2.6741 2.6698 2.6669 2.6668 2.6715
L
H
ML 2.7204 2.7583 2.7997 2.8443 2.8883 2.9425
L
H
FL 2.6708 2.6825 2.6847 2.6785 2.6682 2.6551
L
F
Coop 6.2712 6.1994 6.1200 6.0376 5.9584 5.8518
L
F
N 4.8973 4.9653 5.1101 5.3399 5.6416 6.1548
L
F
ML 4.7675 4.7097 4.6808 4.6808 4.7085 4.8027
L
F
FL 4.8932 4.9844 5.1486 5.3967 5.7125 6.1916
Table 6: Losses − H and F households (LH , LF ) and union-wide (L) − High-Debt
b = 40% b = 50% b = 60% b = 70% b = 80% b = 90% b = 100% b = 110%
nH= 0.5 - Union-wide loss*100
LCoop 4.9456 4.9173 4.8950 4.8790 4.8679 4.8602 4.8550 4.8517
LN 4.9083 4.9870 5.1264 5.2616 5.3746 5.4657 5.5391 5.5991
LML 4.8840 4.9274 5.0697 5.2227 5.3816 5.4507 5.5297 5.5930
LFL 5.1412 5.2830 5.3826 5.4596 5.5226 5.5756 5.6211 5.6606
nH= 0.8 - Union-wide loss*100
LCoop 3.4394 3.4152 3.3917 3.3726 3.3577 3.3462 3.3373 3.3305
LN 3.4686 3.4900 3.5174 3.5413 3.5608 3.5767 3.5902 3.6018
LML 3.3425 3.3916 3.4625 3.5078 3.5360 3.5563 3.5728 3.5868
LFL 3.4998 3.5420 3.5623 3.5753 3.5855 3.5946 3.6031 3.6111
nH= 0.8 - Loss of a representative household country H and F
L
H
Coop 2.8423 2.7833 2.7272 2.6810 2.6440 2.6146 2.5910 2.5717
L
H
N 2.6277 2.5687 2.5232 2.4906 2.4671 2.4496 2.4360 2.4251
L
H
ML 2.7470 2.6293 2.5531 2.5040 2.4721 2.4506 2.4352 2.4236
L
H
FL 2.5536 2.5029 2.4701 2.4484 2.4332 2.4217 2.4127 2.4054
L
F
Coop 5.8276 5.9426 6.0497 6.1391 6.2122 6.2724 6.3228 6.3656
L
F
N 6.8319 7.1753 7.4944 7.7439 7.9352 8.0853 8.2070 8.3088
L
F
ML 5.7244 6.4406 6.5449 7.5228 7.7913 7.9794 8.1231 8.2398
L
F
FL 7.2844 7.6980 7.1275 8.0828 8.1951 8.2862 8.3643 8.4339
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